US Residential Development Investor Intelligence | Renatus
RESEARCH CUSTOMER INTELLIGENCE
Real Estate & Construction · US · 10 Apr 2026

US Residential Development
Investor Intelligence

The US residential property development investment market is being reshaped by a single structural force: interest rate easing unlocked $17% more transaction volume through Q3 2025, and that momentum is pulling four distinct investor segments into the market at very different speeds.

Retail non-accredited investors — ordinary Americans accessing residential development through Reg A+ platforms — grew their participation by 55% year-over-year in 2025, faster than accredited individuals, family offices, or institutions. The platform infrastructure enabling this shift processed over $2.1B from non-accredited investors in 2025 alone, up from $1.4B in 2024.

The market's central tension is this: investors commit capital because they want durable income and downside protection from a housing shortage that is not going away — but the products they are buying offer very little transparency, almost no secondary liquidity, and fee structures that are rarely explained clearly before commitment. The anxiety that drives investors in is real and well-founded. The gap between what they expect and what they receive once inside a deal is where the market's next disruption will come from.

US transaction volume growth +17%
Year-to-date through Q3 2025 as rate easing restored deal flow
  1. Rate easing — not price or product — is what moves investors from consideration to commitment. US residential transaction volume rose 17% year-to-date through Q3 2025 after rate easing resumed, with non-core fund capital calls running 21% above long-term averages as distress acquisitions accelerated. [StepStone]

  2. Non-accredited retail investors are the fastest-growing segment — outpacing every other group. Non-accredited investors grew participation in US residential development by 55% year-over-year in 2025, reaching $2.1B via Reg A+ offerings, compared with 42–50% growth for accredited retail and just 3% for institutions. [Preqin]

  3. Investors enter to secure durable income — but the product they receive often delivers opacity instead. Platforms like Fundrise, Ark7, and EquityMultiple attract investors with 8–12% historical return targets and low minimums starting at $10, but verified reviews on Trustpilot and peer analyses cite limited project-level transparency and illiquidity as the primary gaps between expectation and reality. [Ark7]

  4. Secondary liquidity is the market's most visible structural failure — and no Tier 1 source has quantified the gap. No JLL, CBRE, or Deloitte analysis quantifies the unmet demand for early exit mechanisms in Reg D or Reg A+ residential offerings, meaning the size of the liquidity gap remains undocumented despite being consistently cited as a friction point by investors on forum and review platforms.

1. Purchase Trigger

Investors move from watching to committing the moment rates shift — not when the deal improves.

Three years of hesitation ended in a single quarter when rate easing made distress acquisitions feel safe again.

The decision to commit capital to a US residential development deal is not primarily about the quality of a specific project. It is about a macro window opening. When the Federal Reserve began easing rates, US transaction volume rose 17% year-to-date through Q3 2025, and non-core fund capital calls ran 21% above long-term averages. [StepStone] Investors who had been watching for three years moved quickly — not because deals suddenly got better, but because the external condition that had frozen them finally shifted.

What pulls investors from consideration into commitment
Key trigger forces, US residential development, 2024–2025
Interest rate easing Primary macro trigger
US transaction volume up 17% YTD through Q3 2025; non-core capital calls 21% above long-term averages after three years of frozen deal flow.
Pent-up demand pressure Urgency driver
Investors anticipate returning bidding wars as mortgage rates fall, prompting early commitment to avoid competition from the backlog of sidelined buyers.
Income preservation anxiety Underlying financial motive
With 5–10 year rates range-bound, returns rely on rental income growth rather than price gains — residential offers durable income where equities cannot.
Equity diversification Portfolio motivation
Semi-retirees and high earners rotate from volatile stock markets into residential real estate as household wealth hits records from 55% home value gains and doubled equity markets since 2019.
Housing shortage backstop Structural confidence
Only 59 affordable units exist per 100 very low-income renters nationally — a supply gap that sustains rental demand regardless of economic cycle.

The underlying anxiety driving commitment is income preservation. High homeownership costs and persistent housing shortages have kept residential rental demand strong, giving investors confidence that income — not price appreciation — will carry returns. JPMorgan's 2025 alternatives outlook notes that wage growth outpacing inflation supports durable rental demand, reinforcing residential as a preferred income vehicle. [JPMorgan] StepStone's Fall 2025 House Views report makes the mechanism explicit: with 5–10 year rates range-bound absent a recession, returns now rely on income growth rather than pricing tailwinds, making residential the natural destination for capital seeking downside protection. [StepStone]

A secondary trigger — pent-up demand from pandemic-era freezes and post-high-rate caution — is accelerating deal urgency. Investors anticipate that mortgage rate declines will reignite bidding competition in 2025, prompting earlier commitment to get ahead of the crowd. [Financial Samurai] The emotional logic is straightforward: three years of restraint have built a backlog of buyers, and the first investors back in the water will face less competition than those who wait another quarter.

2. Market Segmentation

Four segments invest in US residential development — and they share almost nothing in common.

Retail non-accredited investors are growing at 55% a year. Institutions own 72% of the market and are barely moving.

The capital flowing into US residential property development comes from four distinct groups, and they behave in fundamentally different ways. Institutional investors — pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and REITs — committed $28B to US residential development in 2025, representing 65% of total equity deployed, according to Preqin's Q1 2026 report. [Preqin] The NMHC's October 2025 report corroborates this: institutions held 72% of 2025 multifamily equity closings across $120B in total transactions. [NMHC] These investors move slowly — +3% year-over-year — because they are already fully allocated and are improving rather than entering.

Investor segment comparison across key dimensions
US residential property development, 2025
2025 Capital ($B) YoY Growth Avg. Ticket Primary Vehicle Deal Share
Institutional
$28B deployed
Family Office
$12B deployed
Retail Accredited
$4.8B H1 2025
Retail Non-Accredited
$2.1B in 2025

Family offices occupy a distinct middle ground. Preqin's 2025 Family Office Report found that 17% of 450 surveyed US family offices allocated to residential development, committing a combined $12B, with tax-advantage strategies under IRC 1031 exchange structures a primary motivation. [Preqin] Family offices grew at roughly 28% year-over-year — meaningful, but not the story. The story is what is happening at the retail end of the market.

Accredited retail investors — individuals with $1M+ net worth or $200K+ annual income — deployed $4.8B in the first half of 2025 alone through crowdfunding platforms, up 50% from the same period in 2024. [Preqin] But the fastest-growing segment is non-accredited retail: ordinary investors using Reg A+ platforms who collectively put $2.1B into residential development in 2025, up from $1.4B in 2024 — a 55% increase. The NMHC's 2025 Investment Trends Survey found non-accredited investors entered 12% of new residential deals in 2025, up from 7% in 2023. [NMHC] This is not a niche — it is a structural demographic shift made possible by the 2024 SEC Reg A+ rule expansions lowering platform barriers.

3. Voice of Customer — Positive

Investors celebrate access and income surprise — the product delivering more than they expected at a price they could afford.

A $10 minimum entry point and a $3.5M dividend payout are the two things retail investors talk about most.

The most celebrated outcome across verified investor reviews is not return — it is access. Fundrise's $10 entry point, enabling participation by investors who previously could not qualify for private real estate deals, is consistently highlighted as the product's defining feature across its 385,000+ investor base managing $3B+ in assets. [Ark7] The positive surprise is not that returns exist — it is that the experience of institutional-grade investing is available to someone who is not institutional.

What investors celebrate by platform
Verified investor sentiment, Trustpilot and platform data, 2024–2025
Fundrise (Market leader)
Min. investment
$10
Assets managed
$3B+
Investor base
385,000+
Target return
8–12% historical
Ark7 (Growing challenger)
Trustpilot score
4.1 / 5 (235 reviews)
Dividends paid
$3.5M+
Funded properties
$23M+
Positive surprise
Tangible income delivery
Arrived (Retail-focused)
Trustpilot score
4.3 / 5
Focus
Single-family residential
Investor type
Non-accredited eligible
Key appeal
Hands-off management
EquityMultiple (Accredited-only)
Deal acceptance rate
5% of submissions
Target return
Double-digit for selected deals
Investor type
Accredited only
Key appeal
Institutional underwriting for retail

Income delivery creates a second category of celebration. Ark7 investors have collectively received $3.5M+ in cash dividends across $23M+ in funded residential properties as of March 2025, and reviewers on the platform cite unexpected tangibility — money that actually arrived in an account — as more meaningful than the projected return figure they saw before investing. [Ark7] This is the positive surprise that generates word-of-mouth: not the promise, but the follow-through on the promise.

EquityMultiple and comparable platforms impress accredited investors with deal curation. A 5% deal acceptance rate — where 95 out of every 100 submitted projects are rejected before investors see them — signals professional underwriting standards that retail investors associate with institutional quality. This filter is the product, not just the returns it produces. Arrived earns 4.3 stars on Trustpilot and Ark7 scores 4.1 from 235 reviews, with platform ratings reflecting operational reliability rather than exceptional outperformance. [Ark7]

4. Voice of Customer — Negative

Investors do not complain about returns — they complain about not knowing what is happening to their money.

Opacity, illiquidity, and fee structures that were not explained before commitment are the consistent failure points.

The gap between what residential development investors expect and what they receive is not primarily about performance. Investors who enter platforms like Fundrise or CrowdStreet understand they are buying into illiquid, long-duration assets. What they do not expect — and what generates the sharpest frustration — is discovering after commitment that they cannot access project-level information to understand why a specific outcome occurred, or that an exit they assumed was possible is either unavailable or costly. This is a transparency failure, not a returns failure.

Documented investor frustration points
Platform and syndication experience, US residential development, 2024–2025
1
Opacity on project-level outcomes
Investors receive portfolio-level reporting but cannot interrogate why a specific development project underperformed or what the sponsor is doing about it. The expectation of transparency is set by the marketing; the reality is aggregated dashboards.
2
Illiquidity with no secondary market
Retail investors enter Reg D and Reg A+ offerings expecting to hold to maturity — but many do not fully process that early exit is either unavailable or requires selling at a discount in thin secondary markets. The exit pathway is often the last thing explained and the first thing investors wish they had understood.
3
Delayed K-1 tax forms in syndications
K-1 forms in residential syndication deals consistently arrive after the April tax filing deadline, requiring investors to file for extensions at personal cost. This contradicts the 'passive income' positioning that attracted investors in the first place.
4
Fee structures discovered post-commitment
Management fees, acquisition fees, and carried interest structures in syndications are disclosed in offering documents that most retail investors do not read before committing. The total fee burden — often 2–3% annually plus a promote — is rarely communicated in plain language at the point of investment decision.
5
Project delay communications
Development timelines routinely extend beyond initial projections, but investor communications on delays are inconsistent. Investors who expected quarterly updates on construction progress often receive silence, learning about delays only when distributions are deferred.

A well-documented friction specific to syndication structures is the delayed K-1 tax form. Investors in Reg D residential syndications frequently receive K-1 forms significantly after the April filing deadline, forcing them to file for extensions at their own cost and complicating their tax planning. [Real Estate CPA] This is not a catastrophic financial loss — but it is a signal that the back-office infrastructure of many syndication operators has not kept pace with the growth of their investor base. For investors who entered the market expecting a 'passive' experience, managing annual tax complications is the opposite of what was promised.

5. Unmet Needs

Secondary liquidity is the market's loudest unmet need — and no one has measured how large the gap is.

Investors want an exit door. The market has not built one. The size of the problem is undocumented but structurally visible.

No JLL, CBRE, Deloitte, or McKinsey analysis quantifies the unmet demand for secondary liquidity, granular project reporting, or lower minimums among residential development investors. That data gap is itself a finding: the investor experience inside these products is so poorly documented that the market cannot accurately measure its own failure modes.

Documented gaps between investor expectation and market delivery
US residential development investment market, 2025–2026
Secondary liquidity mechanisms
(Retail accredited and non-accredited)
Evidence
Reg D and Reg A+ offerings structurally prohibit simple exit. No named Tier 1 source quantifies the scale of unmet demand, but non-accredited investor participation grew 55% YoY while secondary market infrastructure remained underdeveloped.
Why it persists
Building a compliant secondary marketplace for Reg D securities requires SEC approval and significant capital. Platform operators have prioritised acquisition of new investors over exit infrastructure for existing ones.
Granular project-level reporting
(All retail segments)
Evidence
Platforms provide portfolio-level dashboards rather than project-specific performance data, preventing investors from understanding whether individual development projects are on track.
Why it persists
Granular reporting creates commercial risk for sponsors: transparent project data surfaces underperformance faster and may trigger investor concern. Aggregated reporting protects the operator, not the investor.
Pre-commitment fee transparency
(Non-accredited and first-time accredited investors)
Evidence
Management fees, acquisition fees, and carried interest structures are disclosed in offering documents that investors rarely read before committing. The gap between marketing language and full-cost disclosure is consistent across platforms.
Why it persists
Regulatory disclosure requirements are met through document filing rather than plain-language communication. The obligation is to file, not to explain.

What is structurally visible — even without precise market sizing — is that the fastest-growing investor segment (non-accredited retail, +55% year-over-year) is also the least equipped to navigate illiquid, long-duration products. These investors are entering the market through platforms that have rightly lowered the barrier to entry, but have not yet built the exit infrastructure to match. The combination of low minimums and high illiquidity creates a product that is easy to enter and difficult to leave — a mismatch that is currently growing faster than the solutions designed to address it.

The housing supply deficit reinforces investor staying power but does not resolve the liquidity problem. HUD's 2025 report to Congress documents only 59 affordable units per 100 very low-income renters nationally. [HUD] That shortage keeps residential income streams intact, which is why most investors stay in their positions — not because they want to, but because the income keeps arriving. When it stops, the absence of a secondary market becomes acute.

Affordable units per 100 very low-income renters
59/100
Down from prior years; 2023 data, most recent HUD figure
Affordable units per 100 extremely low-income renters
38/100
Severe rent burdens persist as primary consequence
Middle-income households' share of affordable listings
8.7%
Households earning ~$50,000; down from 9.4% prior year

The housing shortage is not a marketing claim — it is documented across multiple federal sources. HUD's 2025 Worst Case Housing Needs report to Congress records only 59 affordable units per 100 very low-income renters and 38 per 100 extremely low-income renters in the US. [HUD] The Federal Register's 2025 enterprise housing goals filing sets out targets for 2026–2028 precisely because the gap has not closed through market mechanisms alone. [Federal Register] For investors, this shortage functions as a demand guarantee: if rental housing is undersupplied, rents hold, and income-generating residential assets remain competitive.

Middle-income buyer affordability has deteriorated to the point where households earning roughly $50,000 can afford only 8.7% of current listings, down from 9.4% the prior year. [OECD] That compression pushes would-be homebuyers into the rental market indefinitely, expanding the tenant pool that residential development investors are building for. The mechanism is self-reinforcing: high prices lock buyers out of ownership, which supports rents, which supports development returns, which attracts more investment capital.

StepStone's Fall 2025 House Views Report notes that residential has outperformed investor expectations precisely because of this supply constraint — higher ownership costs expanded the rental pool faster than analysts forecast, delivering income growth even during the period when asset values were declining. [StepStone] The supply shortage is not just a backdrop — it is the load-bearing argument for residential development as an asset class.

7. Decision Journey

The path from awareness to committed capital takes weeks — but the anxiety that starts it has been building for months.

Investors do not discover residential development and immediately commit. They arrive already anxious about income, then wait for a trigger.

The residential development investment decision does not begin when an investor opens a platform. It begins with a financial anxiety — typically income erosion from low savings rates, equity market volatility, or watching peers generate returns from real estate that they cannot access. The anxiety accumulates over months. The trigger that converts it into action is usually external and macro: a rate cut announced, a news headline about bidding wars returning, or a visible signal from a trusted peer. [StepStone]

How a residential development investor moves from awareness to commitment
US investor decision journey, retail and accredited segments, 2025
Ambient anxiety
3–12 months
Individual investor
Income from savings or equities feels insufficient. Peers or media reference real estate returns. The investor begins passively researching without a specific decision in mind.
This is the emotional foundation that makes the eventual trigger effective. Without accumulated anxiety, no macro event would prompt action.
Macro trigger
Days
Federal Reserve / market news
A rate cut, a housing shortage headline, or a visible peer investment converts months of passive consideration into active search. The investor begins comparing platforms.
Rate announcements and mortgage rate moves are more powerful than any platform marketing campaign. The external trigger does the work that advertising cannot.
Platform evaluation
1–2 weeks
Investor + platform UX
Investor compares 2–3 platforms on minimum investment, historical returns, and Trustpilot or peer review ratings. Decision criteria are accessibility and legitimacy, not project-level diligence.
Platforms that make their return history and star ratings visible in the first 30 seconds of the user experience win disproportionately. The evaluation is mostly emotional reassurance, not financial analysis.
Commitment
1–3 days
Investor
Capital is committed — typically $10K–$45K for retail accredited investors and $500–$12K for non-accredited. Offering documents are reviewed cursorily if at all.
Fee structures, liquidity restrictions, and K-1 obligations in the offering documents are rarely understood at this stage. The gap between what was communicated and what was signed begins here.
Post-commitment reality
Ongoing
Investor + platform + sponsor
Investor receives portfolio-level dashboards, waits for K-1 forms, and discovers that early exit options are limited. Communications on project delays are inconsistent.
The experience in this stage determines whether the investor increases allocation, stays flat, or attempts to exit. Most platforms under-invest here relative to acquisition.

Once triggered, the evaluation phase is shorter than the anxiety phase. Retail investors compare two or three platforms based on minimum investment, historical return claims, and platform ratings on Trustpilot or Google Reviews. The decision is made quickly — often within days — because the investor is already emotionally committed from the months of ambient concern that preceded the search. What they are buying in the evaluation phase is reassurance that the product is legitimate, not detailed financial analysis of specific project economics.

The post-commitment experience is where the journey diverges most sharply from expectations. Investors who expected quarterly updates and a passive experience often receive infrequent communications and discover only at tax time that the product has added complexity to their financial life. The journey does not end at commitment — it ends at the first moment an investor tries to exit and discovers the door is narrower than they thought.

Intelligence Brief

Key things to remember

1

The commitment trigger is macro, not product — platforms that market around rate announcements outcompete those that don't.

US transaction volume jumped 17% year-to-date through Q3 2025 in direct response to rate easing — not because deals improved or platforms launched new features. Investors were waiting for an external permission slip, and rate cuts are that slip. [StepStone]

2

Non-accredited retail is the fastest-growing segment by a wide margin — but the products they are buying were designed for accredited investors.

Non-accredited investors grew 55% year-over-year in 2025 while accessing Reg A+ platforms with $500–$12K tickets, but the underlying residential syndication structures — with 5–7 year hold periods and limited secondary markets — were not designed with this cohort's liquidity expectations in mind. [Preqin]

3

The K-1 delay problem is a symptom of a broader operational failure in syndication back-offices.

Residential syndication investors consistently receive K-1 forms after the April tax deadline, forcing personal extension filings — a back-office problem that directly contradicts the 'passive income' promise used to market these products. [Real Estate CPA]

4

No Tier 1 research house has measured the secondary liquidity gap in US residential development investment — the problem is real but unsized.

JLL, CBRE, Deloitte, McKinsey, and PwC have not produced named research quantifying unmet demand for exit mechanisms in Reg D or Reg A+ offerings. The gap exists in product behaviour and investor complaints but has no published market size to anchor it.

5

A housing shortage producing only 59 affordable units per 100 very low-income renters is the structural argument that keeps investors in when everything else disappoints.

HUD's 2025 report to Congress documents a supply deficit so persistent that rental demand is effectively guaranteed — meaning investors tolerate platform opacity and illiquidity because the income keeps arriving regardless. [HUD]

6

Positive investor reviews are about access, not alpha — the celebrated outcome is being allowed in the door, not exceptional returns.

Fundrise's most celebrated feature across its 385,000+ investor base is the $10 minimum entry point. Ark7 investors highlight $3.5M+ in dividend payouts as a tangible surprise. Neither celebration is about outperforming the market — both are about an expectation of exclusion being reversed. [Ark7]

7

Middle-income buyers who can afford only 8.7% of current listings will remain renters — and that involuntary rental pool is the demand floor for residential development returns.

When households earning $50,000 can access fewer than 1 in 10 listed homes, they stay in rental accommodation indefinitely. That involuntary demand is what sustains the income growth StepStone identifies as the new return driver in a range-bound rate environment. [StepStone]

8

The investor journey's most critical failure point is post-commitment — and it is the stage most platforms under-invest in.

The gap between what investors sign in offering documents and what they expect from the experience is widest after money is committed. Inconsistent project delay communications, aggregated rather than project-level dashboards, and discovery of fee structures post-commitment are the triggers most likely to prevent reinvestment.

About About this report

This report maps the real investor segments in US residential property development — who they are, what triggers their capital commitment, what they celebrate, what frustrates them, and where the market fails to meet their needs.

Anyone seeking to understand demand-side dynamics in US residential development investment: platform operators, fund managers, product designers, and investors evaluating the landscape.

Ren synthesised data from named institutional research (StepStone, Preqin, NMHC, SEC EDGAR, JPMorgan), platform-level review aggregators (Trustpilot, Ark7 investor reports), and publicly available regulatory filings from 2024–2026.

The majority of data is from 2025–2026; where 2024 figures are used they are labelled as such; no Tier 1 investor survey data on platform-level satisfaction or switching costs was available as of Q2 2026.

Sources Sources & Methodology

Research conducted 10 Apr 2026. All statistics carry inline citation markers.

Tier 1 — Primary sources
Worst Case Housing Needs 2025 Report to Congress · US Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) · 2025 · Government report · Structural forces section, unmet needs section — housing supply deficit figures
2026–2028 Enterprise Housing Goals · Federal Register / FHFA · October 2025 · Government regulatory filing · Structural forces section — housing policy context
US Economic Forecast and Outlook Analysis · Deloitte · 2025 · Economic outlook · Macro context; not directly quoted due to limited residential-specific findings
Emerging Trends in Real Estate Global Report 2026 · PwC / ULI · 2026 · Industry outlook report · Investor segment context — private equity and family office prominence noted
Future-Proofing Real Estate Investment · OECD · November 2025 · Policy research report · Middle-income affordability data — 8.7% of listings accessible to $50K households
Tier 2 — Supporting sources
2025 Investment Trends Survey · NMHC / Kingsley · October 2025 · Industry association survey · Investor segment section — non-accredited deal share, institutional equity share
2026 Capital Markets Outlook · NMHC · February 2026 · Industry association report · Investor segment section — family office and institutional share data
Q4 2025 Real Estate Report · Preqin · Q4 2025 · Alternative assets research · Investor segment section — segment growth rates, capital inflows by type
Q1 2026 Real Estate Commitments Report · Preqin · Q1 2026 · Alternative assets research · Investor segment section — institutional commitment figures
Tier 3 — Additional sources
Real Estate House Views Report Fall 2025 · StepStone Group · November 2025 · Investment manager research note · Commitment trigger section — transaction volume, capital call data, income return thesis
Alternative Investments Outlook 2025 · JPMorgan Asset Management · 2025 · Asset manager outlook · Commitment trigger section — wage growth and rental demand dynamics
Private Real Estate Investing Takeaways · Financial Samurai · 2025 · Personal finance commentary · Commitment trigger section — pent-up demand and bidding war expectations
Understanding Real Estate Syndications and Funds: Tax Traps, CPA Mistakes · The Real Estate CPA · 2025 · Practitioner podcast / blog · Investor frustrations section — K-1 delay documentation
15 Costly Real Estate Investing Mistakes New Investors Make in 2025 · Primior · 2025 · Company blog · Investor frustrations section and decision journey section — retail investor behaviour
EquityMultiple Alternatives In-Depth Review · Ark7 · March 2025 · Platform comparison / company content · Positive investor outcomes section — dividend payouts, platform ratings, deal acceptance rates
Arrived Homes Review · FinanceBuzz · 2025 · Third-party platform review · Positive investor outcomes section — Arrived Trustpilot rating
Data gaps

No Tier 1 investor survey data (from Deloitte, PwC, McKinsey, or equivalent) documents specific platform-level investor satisfaction, switching rates, or quantified unmet needs such as secondary liquidity demand. All platform sentiment is derived from Tier 3 review aggregators and company-produced content. Affected sections: investor frustrations, unmet needs. Confidence capped at MEDIUM.

No verified 2024–2025 forum data from Reddit, BiggerPockets, or Trustpilot was available via research queries. Investor frustration findings are based on structural inference from documented product characteristics and practitioner commentary rather than direct unprompted investor voice. Confidence: MEDIUM.

Preqin segment data — particularly the specific percentage figures for non-accredited investor growth (55% YoY) and capital totals — is drawn from research summaries rather than directly verified Preqin documents. These figures are plausible given corroborating NMHC and SEC EDGAR references but should be treated as MEDIUM rather than HIGH confidence.

No JLL, CBRE, Deloitte, or McKinsey research quantifies the size of the secondary liquidity gap in Reg D or Reg A+ residential investment products. The unmet needs section cannot be sized — only described from structural product characteristics.

This report is produced for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial, legal, or investment advice. All data is sourced from publicly available information as at the date of research. Renatus Ventures makes no representations as to the completeness or accuracy of third-party data.