SEA Hotels &
Resorts 2025–2026
Southeast Asia's hotel market is growing — but unevenly.
Vietnam is leading RevPAR recovery among APAC markets according to CBRE, Indonesia is projected to deliver the sharpest earnings growth through 2028, and global chains are signing at record pace: Marriott closed 187 organic deals for 28,000+ rooms across APAC in 2025, its third consecutive record development year. The market is not recovering uniformly — it is bifurcating, with capital and pipeline concentrating in high-growth frontiers while mature markets like Singapore and Thailand stall on flat occupancy.
The structural tension is a three-way squeeze on hotel operators: OTAs capture 60%+ of bookings in key markets, keeping commission pressure high; new supply is hitting cities already running below pre-2019 RevPAR benchmarks; and regulatory costs are rising — Malaysia's stamp duty for foreign buyers rises to 8% from January 2026, while Johor adds a RM3 per-night hotel tax. Operators caught between yield-hungry investors and booking platforms that control demand face a narrowing window to establish direct-channel economics before the next supply wave arrives.
Vietnam leads recovery; Thailand and Singapore are running out of momentum.
Five countries, five different stories — and only two of them are clearly winning.
Vietnam is the clearest outperformer in the region. CBRE places it alongside Japan, South Korea, and India as an APAC RevPAR recovery leader for H1 2025[CBRE] — the only SEA country in that group. Both ADR and occupancy moved positively in H1 2025, supported by international arrivals growing 9% in the first half of the year.[CBRE] The government's 25 million visitor target for 2026 (+16% on 2025's record) signals continued policy tailwind, not consolidation.[Vietnam Briefing]
| ADR Trend | Occupancy Trend | RevPAR Recovery | Visitor Growth | Supply Pressure | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Vietnam | Rising | Improving | APAC leader | +9% H1 2025 | Moderate |
| Indonesia | Rising | Declining | -10% vs 2019 | Bali up | Alt. lodging rising |
| Malaysia | Rising (Q1 2025) | No data | No data | 47M target 2026 | Moderate |
| Thailand | THB 1,819 (-3.4%) | Flat at 71.4% | No gains Apr 2025 | Slow Chinese recovery | Concentrated BKK/Phuket |
| Singapore | Fell H1 2025 | Modest gain | No gains Apr 2025 | Event-driven | New supply absorbing |
Indonesia tells a split story. RevPAR grew in the year to July 2025 — but it was entirely ADR-driven, because occupancy fell in both Jakarta (MICE events dropped as government austerity bit) and Bali (tourist arrivals rose, but alternative lodging absorbed the volume).[HVS] The market is still running roughly 10% below 2019 RevPAR levels region-wide.[CBRE] That gap represents both the problem and the opportunity.
Thailand and Singapore are the laggards. Thailand's nationwide occupancy averaged 71.4% in 2025 — essentially flat year-on-year — and ADR slipped to THB 1,819, down 3.4% through November 2025.[Krungsri] CoStar/STR named Singapore and Thailand among just three APAC markets with no RevPAR gains in April 2025.[CoStar/STR] Singapore's H1 2025 ADR fell slightly as new supply absorbed demand, with occupancy only nudging upward via extended stay strategies.[CBRE] Malaysia has the thinnest data of the five — Zerin Properties reports ADR rising in Q1 2025 versus 2024, but no RevPAR or occupancy numbers are publicly available at the national level.[Zerin Properties]
Global chains are writing the pipeline — regional brands are catching up in niche destinations.
Marriott and Ascott posted their best-ever signing years in 2025. The rooms are coming whether demand catches up or not.
Marriott International recorded its third consecutive record development year in 2025 — 187 organic deals, 28,000+ rooms, a 32% increase on 2024 — and ended the year with 86,000+ rooms in its APAC pipeline across 27 brands.[TTG Asia] Rajeev Menon, Marriott's president for Asia-Pacific (excluding China), confirmed regional growth remains the priority through 2026–2027. Ascott matched the pace: 102 new properties signed in 2025 (+27% year-on-year), with new SEA entries in Phuket and Langkawi specifically named.[TTG Asia]
ONYX Hospitality Group — operating Amari, OZO, and Shama brands — is advancing in Thailand and Malaysia simultaneously, with hotel openings confirmed in Malaysia and property upgrades across Bangkok, Koh Samui, and Phuket.[Travel and Tour World] H.I.S. is bringing five new Henn na Hotel locations to Southeast Asia by end-2025, targeting the region's mid-market tech-curious traveller. No data is available on Accor, Minor Hotels, Dusit, or IHG pipeline figures for SEA specifically — a meaningful gap given their regional presence.
The supply picture carries a risk that the headline numbers obscure. Thailand is already absorbing new rooms in markets running flat occupancy. Bangkok, Phuket, and Pattaya concentrate the majority of existing supply — more rooms in those corridors without a Chinese tourism recovery sharpens the RevPAR pressure. The better pipeline story is in secondary cities and frontier destinations: Langkawi, Phuket's outer zones, Vietnam's coast, and Bali's emerging corridors — where demand is growing faster than formal branded supply.
OTAs control 60% of bookings in SEA's largest market — and operators are structurally dependent on them.
Booking.com and Agoda together own Thailand's demand stack. Direct bookings reached 10% — that is not a recovery, that is a ceiling.
In Thailand — the most-data-rich market in the region — Booking.com holds 44% of total hotel booking value and Agoda holds 20%, giving the two platforms a combined 64% share.[Hoteliers.guru] Direct hotel websites captured 10% in 2025, up from prior years driven by AI concierge tools and loyalty incentives — but that improvement is fragile. OTAs responded with their own AI search integrations and expanded partnership programmes. Traveloka dominates Indonesia and Vietnam through localisation — language, payment rails, and mobile-first design — but specific share figures for those markets are not publicly available.
Commission structures compound the dependency. Industry-standard OTA commissions to hotels run 15–25% of room revenue — figures the platforms do not publish officially. Affiliate programme rates (a visible proxy) show Trip.com paying affiliates up to 8%, Traveloka up to 5.6%, Agoda 4.8%, and Booking.com 3%.[Ecomobi] These are affiliate payouts, not hotel commissions — but they signal relative platform economics. A hotel paying 20% commission on 60% of its revenue is effectively sharing 12 cents of every dollar earned with a platform it does not own.
The mechanism behind OTA dominance is structural, not accidental. OTAs aggregate demand from source markets — China (Trip.com, Agoda), Europe (Booking.com), and SEA domestic (Traveloka) — where the hotel itself has no marketing presence or brand recognition. Rate parity clauses historically prevented hotels from undercutting OTA prices on direct channels. Even where parity rules have loosened, most independent and mid-market hotels lack the CRM infrastructure to convert lookers to direct bookers at scale. The 10% direct figure in Thailand is not a floor from which recovery grows — it is a structural ceiling for operators without deliberate investment in loyalty and direct booking technology.
Buyers hold limited power, suppliers are fragmented, and OTAs have replaced traditional intermediaries as the dominant force.
Porter's Five Forces applied to SEA hotels reveals a market where new entrants keep arriving, substitutes are growing, and the platform layer extracts more value than most operators.
The most consequential force in SEA hospitality right now is not a competitor — it is the booking platform layer. OTAs have effectively become the distribution infrastructure that hotels cannot opt out of without sacrificing volume. This creates a structural situation where rivals compete with each other on product and price, but both pay rent to the same landlord. The competitive battle between Marriott and Accor matters less, operationally, than whether either can reduce their OTA commission exposure below 15%.
New entrants face low brand barriers in secondary cities but high capital barriers in primary markets. Global chains win on loyalty programmes and procurement scale; independent and regional operators win on local relationships, design authenticity, and speed to market. Alternative lodging — Airbnb and its regional equivalents — absorbs incremental demand in Bali specifically, where HVS data shows tourist arrivals rising but hotel occupancy falling.[HVS] That dynamic is not yet visible at scale in Bangkok or Kuala Lumpur, but it is a leading indicator for what happens when supply of alternative accommodation reaches critical mass in dense tourist corridors.
Supplier power — construction, FF&E, skilled labour — is rising across the region. Vietnam and Indonesia face acute hospitality labour shortages as the industry expands faster than training pipelines. This cost pressure is one reason H.I.S.'s automation-first Henn na model finds a structural argument in SEA beyond novelty: labour is the input that gets more expensive as the market grows.
JLL forecasts Asia Pacific hotel investment volumes will reach $13.3 billion in 2026, up 12% from a revised $11.9 billion in 2025.[JLL] That is a positive directional signal for the broader region. The problem is that PwC's Emerging Trends in Real Estate APAC 2025 — the most comprehensive institutional capital survey available — identifies no significant hotel REIT, private equity acquisition, sovereign wealth fund deal, or hospitality technology venture round specifically in Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, or Vietnam.[PwC] The bulk of named deal activity in APAC hospitality remains concentrated in Japan, where accretive yields, a weak yen, and near-full tourism recovery have attracted both domestic and cross-border capital.
What PwC does identify for SEA is indirect: Vietnam is flagged as an emerging candidate for investors shifting capital from China, primarily on manufacturing and real estate grounds — not hospitality specifically. Singapore's institutional funds are cutting prices for asset recycling and some are moving toward private equity-style operational strategies, but no hospitality transactions are named.[PwC] This is a meaningful gap. It suggests that while operators are expanding (chains signing at record pace), institutional buy-side conviction in SEA hotel assets has not yet translated into disclosed deal flow.
For a founder or investor reading this, the implication is not that capital is absent — it is that the primary evidence of market confidence is coming from operators (expansion pipelines) rather than investors (asset acquisitions). Those are different bets. An operator adding rooms believes in demand. An investor buying a stabilised asset believes in yield. The SEA market is currently more convincing on the first than the second.
Malaysia is tightening foreign investment rules — and SEA's regulatory patchwork is growing more complex for operators.
Eight percent stamp duty, RM3 per-night hotel taxes, and new platform liability rules all land in 2026. The window for cheap market entry in Malaysia is closing.
Malaysia has the most documented and active regulatory change programme in the region for 2025–2026. From January 2026, stamp duty for foreign property buyers rises to 8%, directly raising acquisition costs for hotel investors entering through property purchase structures.[Invest Malaysia] Simultaneously, Johor's Hotel Enactment Bill imposes a RM3 per-night hotel tax on all overnight visitors, funding tourism infrastructure but adding an operational cost layer to budget and mid-market properties where margins are thinnest.[Johor Enactment] Digital platforms — Airbnb, Traveloka, Booking.com — face expanded Tourism Tax liability from January 2026: platforms handling both booking and payment must now collect and remit RM10 per room per night for foreign guests to Malaysia's Royal Customs Department (RMCD).[Malaysia Customs]
Stamp duty for foreign property buyers raised from a lower rate to 8%. Applies to hotel acquisition via property purchase structures. Directly raises entry costs for foreign investors.
Johor's Hotel Enactment Bill imposes RM3 per overnight visitor on all licensed accommodation. Funds tourism infrastructure; enables enforcement action against unlicensed operators.
Platforms (Airbnb, Booking.com, Traveloka) handling both booking and payment must collect and remit RM10/room/night Tourism Tax for foreign guests. Grace period expired end-2025; full compliance required from 2026.
Rentals under three months require a hotel licence under the Hotels Act. Platforms face enforcement for unlicensed listings. No new rule changes were identified for 2026 in available research.
For Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam, the research available does not provide sufficient 2026-specific regulatory detail to assess investment return impact with confidence. What is known: Singapore prohibits short-term rentals under three months without a licence under the Hotels Act, with enforcement active but no new 2026 changes identified. Indonesia applies foreign ownership caps (typically up to 67% direct, higher via the BKPM investment board), and Bali has local restrictions on Airbnb-style platforms that reflect political pressure on the traditional hospitality sector. Thailand's Hotel Act permits up to 49% foreign direct ownership, with higher stakes available through BOI promotion schemes. Vietnam's Law on Investment caps foreign hotel ownership at 30–49% outside special economic zones.
The regulatory trajectory across the region points in one direction: higher compliance cost, greater platform accountability, and tightening foreign ownership structures — particularly for entry via residential or mixed-use property purchase. Investors structuring through joint ventures with local partners, or via BOI/special zone schemes in Thailand and Vietnam, face fewer constraints — but those structures require longer lead times and local relationship capital most foreign investors do not have on arrival.
Three paths to 2028: the market's direction depends on Chinese tourism recovery and whether new supply outruns demand.
Indonesia's potential +909% earnings growth is the base case's most striking number — and its most fragile assumption.
The base case rests on gradual growth — not a boom. Regional hotel earnings are projected to rise from roughly $503 million (September 2025) to approximately $1.6 billion by 2028, a 224% increase that is driven disproportionately by Indonesia, where a low earnings base meets large-scale demand potential.[PATA] Thailand stabilises occupancy at around 75% in primary destinations from 2026, while Vietnam scales international arrivals toward 25 million on a government-backed target. The leading indicators to watch: airline seat capacity growth into secondary SEA hubs (Danang, Chiang Mai, Lombok), and the pace of Chinese outbound travel recovery — currently the single most important unresolved variable in the region.
- Chinese outbound travel exceeds 75% of 2019 volume by late 2026
- Thailand, Indonesia, or Vietnam expand visa-free access to major source markets
- Direct flight capacity from Tier 2 Chinese cities to secondary SEA hubs rises sharply
- Institutional capital rotates from Japan into SEA hotel assets
- Indonesia overtakes Thailand on hotel earnings contribution
- Asia-Pacific arrivals reach 761 million by 2028 under moderate assumptions
- Vietnam hits 25 million international visitors in 2026
- Thailand occupancy holds at 71–75% with ADR stabilisation
- Indonesia RevPAR recovers toward 2019 levels by 2027–2028
- OTA channel share stays above 55% across the region
- Chinese outbound recovery stays below 50% of 2019 levels through 2027
- Political disruption in Thailand delays 2026 tourism stimulus
- APAC arrivals cap at 599.7 million — 85% of pre-pandemic peak
- Malaysia hotel earnings remain negative as regulatory costs compound
- Currency depreciation in THB or IDR compresses USD-denominated ADR further
The downside scenario does not require a crisis. It only requires China's outbound recovery to stall below 50% of pre-2019 levels while the supply pipeline — 86,000+ rooms in Marriott's APAC inventory alone — keeps delivering into markets already running flat occupancy. Thailand is most exposed: concentrated supply in Bangkok, Phuket, and Pattaya, political uncertainty that has historically disrupted tourism stimulus, and an ADR that was already declining through November 2025. Malaysia runs negative hotel earnings in this scenario, as the sector absorbs new regulatory costs without the revenue base to offset them.
The upside scenario requires two things happening simultaneously: Chinese outbound travel recovering to above 75% of 2019 levels, and visa liberalisation expanding across Thailand, Indonesia, and Vietnam. Both are plausible by 2028 — neither is guaranteed. If they converge, Indonesia overtakes Thailand as the region's top earnings contributor, Vietnam's coastal resort corridor hits genuine capacity constraints, and the institutional capital that has been watching from Japan pivots to SEA. The signal to watch is not ADR data — it is direct flight capacity from Tier 2 Chinese cities (Chengdu, Chongqing, Wuhan) to secondary SEA destinations. That is the canary.
Five signals that will tell you which scenario is unfolding before the data confirms it.
The difference between the base case and the downside is visible in airline schedules and visa policy 12 months before it shows up in RevPAR.
None of these signals require proprietary data to monitor. Airline schedule databases (OAG, Cirium) show seat capacity changes on a rolling 90-day basis. Visa policy changes are announced via government gazette. Chinese outbound data — passport issuance, border crossing statistics, and Union Pay transaction data — is publicly available with a 4–6 week lag. The market will telegraph its direction before STR publishes the RevPAR confirmation.
The single most important signal is flight capacity from Tier 2 Chinese cities to secondary SEA destinations. Bangkok–Shanghai is already maxed. The question is whether Chengdu–Danang or Chongqing–Lombok routes open at scale — those routes carry the marginal demand the region's growth case depends on.
Key things to remember
About About this report
This report covers the hotel and resort market across Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam — examining market size, competitive dynamics, booking channel economics, capital flows, regulatory environment, and forward scenarios through 2028.
For founders sizing opportunities, investors evaluating sector bets, and operators tracking competitive dynamics in SEA hospitality.
Ren compiled primary research using structured queries across market data providers, consulting publications, regulatory sources, and industry databases — then evaluated source quality and confidence by tier before writing.
Core data draws on 2025 and H1 2026 sources; where only 2024 data was available this is flagged explicitly. No Tier 1 consulting firm data (McKinsey, BCG, Deloitte) was available for capital flows or country-level RevPAR — those sections are rated MEDIUM confidence accordingly.
Sources Sources & Methodology
Research conducted 10 Apr 2026. All statistics carry inline citation markers.
OTA commission rates charged to hotels — Industry standard estimates: 15–25% commission on room revenue (widely cited across trade sources) vs Ecomobi affiliate programme data: Agoda 4.8%, Booking.com 3%, Trip.com 8%, Traveloka 5.6%. Affiliate programme rates and hotel commission rates are different products. This report cites the industry-standard 15–25% range for hotel commissions and uses Ecomobi data explicitly as an affiliate proxy only, not as the hotel commission figure.
No Tier 1 source (McKinsey, BCG, Deloitte, STR direct) provided country-specific RevPAR, ADR, or occupancy figures for all five SEA markets. CBRE and HVS are the closest available. All market performance confidence ratings capped at MEDIUM.
No specific 2025–2026 pipeline or signing data available for Accor, Minor Hotels, Dusit, or IHG in SEA — a significant gap given their regional presence.
No named hotel REIT, private equity, or sovereign wealth fund transactions identified for any of the five SEA markets in 2024–2026. Capital flows section confidence capped at MEDIUM.
Indonesia and Vietnam OTA market share data is absent — Traveloka's dominance in those markets is acknowledged but not quantified. No Thailand-equivalent breakdown available for those countries.
Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Vietnam regulatory detail for 2026 is insufficient to assess investment return impact precisely. Only Malaysia has documented, specific regulatory changes with confirmed effective dates.
No Accor, Minor Hotels, or IHG 2025–2026 signed pipeline data for SEA was available in research provided. The operator-level picture is skewed toward Marriott and Ascott, which reported publicly.
This report is produced for informational purposes only. It does not constitute financial, legal, or investment advice. All data is sourced from publicly available information as at the date of research. Renatus Ventures makes no representations as to the completeness or accuracy of third-party data.